

REDUCING CRIME

Through

INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING



BJA

Bureau of Justice Assistance
U.S. Department of Justice

Reducing Crime Through Intelligence-Led Policing

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Executive Summary

Through the Targeting Violent Crime Initiative, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, has identified numerous law enforcement agencies throughout the United States that have experienced tremendous success in combating complex crime problems plaguing their communities. A cornerstone of these agencies' efforts appears to be the incorporation of intelligence-led policing, along with other initiatives, to address their crime problems.

To better understand the role of ILP in these successes, BJA requested a study of selected programs that represent a broad spectrum of agencies that are geographically diverse and varied in agency size and available resources. The purpose of the study was to identify commonalities, challenges, and best practices that may be replicated in other jurisdictions.

The study was composed of case studies of selected agencies and involved delving into the nature and scope of the crime problems targeted, examining institutional changes made to address those crime problems, and identifying ongoing or newly implemented complementary efforts. Many, but not all, agencies selected for the study were grantees of the BJA Targeting Violent Crime Initiative.

A protocol was developed to collect program information, and a team visited ten agencies to review data and policies and conduct interviews. Although the agencies exhibited differing operational practices and organizational styles, it quickly became apparent that they shared certain commonalities that were critical to their success. These include:

- Command commitment
- Problem clarity
- Active collaboration
- Effective intelligence
- Information sharing
- Clearly defined goals
- Results-oriented tactics and strategies
- Holistic investigations
- Officer accountability
- Continuous assessment

The case studies in this report validate the fact that implementing ILP substantially enhanced the ability of these high-performing agencies to achieve success. ILP was implemented in varying degrees within these agencies and was often complemented by other policing practices, such as community policing, problem solving, and CompStat based on robust data collection and analysis.

The success of these programs also reflects BJA's principles of:

- Emphasizing local control
- Building relationships in the field

- Developing collaborations and partnerships
- Promoting capacity building through planning
- Encouraging innovation

Sharing these successes in a publication such as this reflects BJA's commitment to communicating the value of justice efforts to decisionmakers at every level.

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Austin, Texas, Police Department

Chief Art Acevedo
Deputy Chief David Carter
Commander Troy Gay
Ms. Karen Jackson

Evans County, Georgia, Sheriff's Office

Sheriff Randall Tippins
Chief Deputy John Edwards

Medford, Oregon, Police Department

Chief Randy Schoen (Retired)
Deputy Chief Tim George

Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Police Department

Chief Edward A. Flynn
Ms. Nicole Demotto
Captain John Hagen

Palm Beach County, Florida, Sheriff's Office

Sheriff Ric Bradshaw
Chief Deputy Michael Gauger
Major Dan McBride
Colonel James Stormes
Lieutenant Michael Wallace

Phoenix, Arizona, Police Department

Chief Jack F. Harris
Lieutenant Charlie Consolian

Richmond, Virginia, Police Department

Chief Bryan T. Norwood
Major Norris L. Evans
Major Sydney G. Collier
Major Eric D. English
Ms. Evelyn V. McGill
Mr. David M. McCoy
Ms. Margaret Horn
Mr. Brian Cummings
Captain Brian Russell
Lieutenant Jeff Goodson
Ms. Renee Tate
Agent Brian Swann
Ms. Tracy Thorne-Begland
Mr. Chris Bullard

San Diego, California, Police Department

Chief William Lansdowne
Lieutenant Jorge Duran
Assistant Chief Robert Kanaski
Lieutenant Andrew Mills
Executive Assistant Chief David Ramirez

San Francisco, California, Police Department

Interim Chief Jeff Godown
Deputy Chief John Murphy

Tampa, Florida, Police Department

Chief Stephen Hogue (Retired)
Chief Jane Castor
Ms. Janet Cid
Lieutenant Kenneth Morman

Introduction and Overview

The purpose of this paper is to report on new experimentation with intelligence-led policing (ILP) to arenas of crime and disorder and beyond terrorism. The Bureau of Justice Assistance, through a competitive grant program, sought ideas for innovative methods to deal with violent crime through the use of ILP. This report describes some of these initiatives that had demonstrable successes.

Background and Methods

Innovation in policing has been characterized by leaders creatively applying ideas or principles from other disciplines to the policing enterprise. For example, the professional era of policing was born through former Berkley, California, police chief August Vollmer,¹ who applied contemporary business management principles as well as ethical standards and a sense of professionalism to policing. His protégé, O.W. Wilson,² expanded Vollmer's vision, particularly by applying management philosophy that was contemporary at the time, such as Frederick Winslow Taylor's *The Principles of Scientific Management*.³ Besides being a police leader, Mr. Wilson authored several policing books, the most widely used of which was *Police Administration*.⁴ Not only did Mr. Wilson solidify the professional model of policing, he also laid a solid foundation of thoughtful, empirically based police management and service delivery that was responsive to crime problems within the community.

Many experiments and innovations built on this foundation—inquiries into the wide array of police services by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice;⁵ the Police Foundation's⁶ wide array of research, particularly on police patrol; and the early research efforts by the predecessor to the Office of Justice Programs, the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. These collective works added significantly to the body of knowledge about the delivery of police services and represented the first significant research testing police practices, including the effects of such long-held basic tenets of policing as preventive patrol and response time.

Around 1980, a significant conceptual shift began occurring, building on the concept of empirical experimentation, toward community-based policing. The significant work of Herman Goldstein in his book *Policing a Free Society*,⁷ followed by his book *Problem-Oriented Policing*;⁸ the work of James Q. Wilson and George Kelling on "Broken Windows,"⁹ which

¹For a description of Vollmer's accomplishments, see <http://www.berkeleyside.com/2010/01/27/remembering-august-vollmer-the-berkeley-police-chief-who-created-modern-policing/>.

²A thumbnail biography of O. W. Wilson can be found at <http://www.bookrags.com/biography/o-w-wilson-cri/>.

³See <http://www.ibiblio.org/elritch/fwt/taylor.html>.

⁴Wilson, O. W., and Roy McClaren. (1977). *Police Administration*. 4th ed. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Publishing.

⁵President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. (1967). *Task Force Report: The Police*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

⁶See <http://www.policefoundation.org/docs/library.html>.

⁷Goldstein, Herman. (1977). *Policing in a Free Society*. New York, NY: Ballinger Publishing Company.

⁸Goldstein, Herman. (1990). *Problem-Oriented Policing*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Publishing.

⁹See http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/atlantic_monthly-broken_windows.pdf.

focused on the reduction of disorder in communities; and Robert Trojanowicz's work on community policing¹⁰ collectively introduced new ways of thinking about the police enterprise. Particularly characteristic of this approach to police service delivery was the use of the scientific method to test different applications and derivatives of these concepts. While there was initially a great deal of resistance in the policing community, the research and experiences of agencies trying the concepts soon demonstrated the value of this paradigm shift.

Emerging from this era of scientific policing was CompStat, led by former New York Police Commissioner (and former Los Angeles Police Chief) William Bratton.¹¹ CompStat integrated many of the lessons learned from previous experimentation: a scientific analysis of crime problems, an emphasis on creative and sustained approaches to solving the crime problems, and strict management accountability. In many ways, CompStat introduced the era of smart policing.¹²

Stimulated by the new law enforcement role in intelligence as a result of the 9/11 attacks, the concept of ILP emerged in the United States. With roots in the British National Intelligence Model,¹³ American ILP relies on analytically understanding multijurisdictional crime threats, developing a pathway toward solving the crime problems, and relying on proactive information sharing, both within the agency and externally with other law enforcement agencies, to maximize the number of law enforcement personnel who may identify indicators of threats and intervene. The lessons learned from police research, community policing, and CompStat provided important insight into how to shape American ILP.

Applying these concepts to pervasive crimes of violence, the Bureau of Justice Assistance¹⁴ (BJA) provided a solicitation for proposals for law enforcement agencies to develop initiatives to fight violence using ILP under the Targeting Violent Crime Initiative (TVCI). The case studies summarized in this publication illustrate how ILP can be used by law enforcement agencies of all sizes to deal with crime problems.

A review of TVCI and related BJA programs was performed to identify ILP initiatives that showed success, could be replicated, and represented agencies of diverse type and geographic location. The variables guiding the selection of the agencies and programs for review were:

- Viability—The programs had to demonstrate some level of success. While some initiatives were too new for extensive assessment, all agencies selected showed sufficient promise for inclusion in the report.
- Collaboration—Information sharing and collaboration among various state, local, and federal agencies were an obvious factor in successful programs and quickly emerged as a major criterion for inclusion.

¹⁰As an example, see <http://www.cj.msu.edu/~people/cp/thebasic.html>.

¹¹As an example, see <http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/3/259.abstract>.

¹²For more information on this concept, see <http://www.smartpolicinginitiative.com/>.

¹³See http://www.npia.police.uk/en/docs/National_Intelligence_Model_C_of_P.pdf.

¹⁴See <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/>.

- **Transferability**—Programs had to be transferable to other jurisdictions. There are numerous programs that are unique to an agency and a particular jurisdiction, but unless the program could be re-created in another agency, there was no point in including it in this report.
- **Sustainability**—The history of law enforcement is replete with fads and one-shot programs that became extinct with a change of command or simply a loss of enthusiasm. Of the criteria used for selection, sustainability was the most difficult to assess. Many of the initiatives reviewed were fairly new; the ones selected, however, demonstrated a level of commitment across a broad spectrum of the community and participating agencies, indicating a high probability of sustainability.

A protocol was developed to collect program information, and a team visited each site to review data and policies and conduct interviews. The agencies selected for review were:

1. Austin, Texas, Police Department
2. Evans County, Georgia, Sheriff's Office
3. Medford, Oregon, Police Department
4. Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Police Department
5. Palm Beach County, Florida, Sheriff's Office
6. Phoenix, Arizona, Police Department
7. Richmond, Virginia, Police Department
8. San Diego, California, Police Department
9. San Francisco, California, Police Department
10. Tampa, Florida, Police Department

Lessons Learned

Each agency visited had different operational and organizational styles. What each had in common with the others, however, was demonstrated effectiveness in a program or in overall operational capabilities. Despite their differences, a review of the programs revealed a number of key factors common to each:

1. Command commitment
2. Problem clarity
3. Active collaboration
4. Effective intelligence
5. Information sharing
6. Clearly defined goals
7. Results-oriented tactics and strategies
8. Holistic investigations
9. Officer accountability
10. Continuous assessment

Command Commitment

In each initiative evaluated, it quickly became apparent that both viability and sustainability were heavily dependent on the commitment by the chief executives of the agencies involved. A primary concern of all programs was whether the initiatives would survive a change of command. A number of departments handled this with a plan of internal succession in which the incoming chief executive had already committed to the programs in place. Other agencies were fortunate enough to have a chief executive with sufficient tenure in office to see all organizational changes institutionalized. Two primary risks to sustainability were observed and discussed among a number of agencies reviewed. The first was the arrival of a new chief executive with a different vision. The second was budget limitations that effectively gutted the program. Both situations posed the greatest risk to program sustainability.

Problem Clarity

A problem cannot be solved unless it is accurately understood. Each agency visited was careful to assess the problems it confronted. A number of departments recounted their problems with the Uniform Crime Reporting system, which is often at odds with their state's crime classifications in the penal code. Those agencies dealing with gang problems emphasized identifying gang leaders and enforcers. Still others sought ways to generate community input. All were definite about the need to clearly understand the problem they were tasked to solve. The key to such clarity was identified as access to accurate information, whether statistical, geographical, or behavioral.

Active Collaboration

Each agency reviewed stressed that the level of success was often dependent on the level of cooperation among partnering agencies. Those agencies working closely with adjacent departments, state and federal agencies, and state and federal prosecutors reported high levels of program success and satisfaction. The reality in the modern world is that no agency can be effective alone. Increasingly, the foundation for success is laid with a network of cooperation between and among overlapping agencies. In the truest sense, this is force multiplication and is the best method for a law enforcement agency to leverage resources not otherwise available.

Effective Intelligence

Intelligence involves the collection of critical information related to the targeted criminality that provides substantive insight into crime threats and identifies individuals for whom there is a reasonable suspicion of relationship to a crime. Information collection is a constant process, along with ongoing information verification and analysis. Analytic products related to threats are disseminated to patrol officers and investigators to aid in the apprehension of offenders and the prevention of crime.

Each agency reviewed stressed the critical nature of intelligence in its operations. For most, the initiatives put in place could not be successful or even exist without a dedicated intelligence capacity.

Information Sharing

Collaboration without sharing information will provide limited success. Law enforcement officers and agencies collect a tremendous amount of information. Often, most of the information collected goes into a personal or departmental file. Yet some of this information is critical to an investigation occurring in an adjacent department. All of the programs in this project stressed the importance of sharing information, and all put procedures in place to ensure the continuous flow of information among their partners. It should be noted that all agencies also had guidelines in place to ensure that the personal privacy of their citizens was protected.

Clearly Defined Goals

Each agency reviewed had clearly stated goals that were easily measurable. Each agency was able to specify with great clarity what it was attempting to do. Whether it was accurately identifying key gang members, clarifying a specific crime problem, or identifying the source of a social problem within the community, each agency and unit was quick to clearly define and establish its goals.

Results-Oriented Tactics and Strategies

Whether targeting gang members, reducing auto theft, or addressing crime problems in specific zones, each program implemented activities designed to attack the problem specified. In every case, the agency or unit could be said to be “bottom line” operations. After establishing goals, each agency created long-term strategies and short-term tactics designed to meet the goals. Not content with vague notions of success, each agency defined success in terms that coincided with established goals. Agencies were considered successful only if the program accomplished what it said it would accomplish.

Holistic Investigations

One of the surprising ideas to emerge from this project was the evolving idea of holistic investigations. Traditionally, criminal investigations focus on a single crime or category of crimes, such as drugs or assault. This is the reason for special investigative units. Law enforcement has long known that many criminals do not specialize, especially if they are part of a gang. A number of the agencies studied emphasized the merging of investigations. For example, some agencies combined the gang and drug units into a single entity. Others encouraged specialized units to expand their investigations into areas beyond their immediate responsibility. connection between auto theft and auto burglary and a wide array of personal and property crimes. While Individuals involved in drug trafficking, for example, may also be involved in property crimes. Prostitutes are often involved in illicit drugs and property crimes. Several agencies stressed the law enforcement agencies have always known this, the agencies reviewed here aggressively pursued those linkages, with impressive stories of success.

Officer Accountability

Accountability was stressed continuously throughout this project. The most successful programs established clearly defined objectives and held their officers accountable for reaching those objectives. In none of these agencies did accountability lead to job dissatisfaction. On the contrary, job satisfaction was very high in all the agencies reviewed. A consistent theme in the agencies that were visited was that job satisfaction among officers was higher because they were able to see the results of their crime control efforts.

Continuous Assessment

One measure of continuing success and sustainability was the ongoing assessment process in each and every initiative. It was stressed that without such assessment, programs can become stagnant. Every program and initiative must confront the “law of diminishing returns,” which states that a new program, although enjoying initial success, will experience diminished success with time. The only way to address this problem is by constantly tweaking the program. In other words, as conditions change, the strategies and goals must change as well. It is continuous assessment and adjustment that keep programs dynamic and viable.

Project Goals

Not every initiative reviewed here is applicable to every other agency. Size, structure, and demand vary widely across jurisdictions. The purpose of this project is to provide information about what has worked for other law enforcement agencies. It is hoped that a description of the various programs, along with agency contact information, will enable agencies to benefit from these experiences.

Austin, Texas, Police Department—Rapid Response

Population: 799,578 ♦ Approximately 1,669 Sworn Officers ♦ 4 Regions

The Problem

It was apparent to the command staff of the Austin Police Department that with the geographic and population growth of Austin, new crime challenges were emerging. Traditional police responses to these emerging crimes did not appear to be stemming the crime trends. Complicating the police response was the growing economic crisis, which was both contributing to new crimes and limiting the police department's traditional approach to crime control.

The Plan

The Austin Police Department management team decided to reengineer its approach to crime control. To begin, the Austin Police Department needed answers to the following core questions:

1. What are the most pressing crime problems and crime trends in the city?
2. What strategies and tactics of the Austin Police Department are effective against these crimes?
3. What new initiatives can the Austin Police Department develop to ensure efficient and effective responses to crime in consideration of limited resources?

Initial self-assessments revealed that CompStat, community policing, and intelligence-led policing (ILP) were critical tools for collecting and managing information to better understand crime and develop effective responses. Critical to this process was the role of analysts. Having previously recognized the importance of the analyst role, the Austin Police Department maintains a high level of analyst staffing: each region has two analysts and additional analysts are assigned to headquarters, with responsibilities for specific crimes, such as homicide and sex crimes.

Applying principles of crime prevention through environmental design first proposed by C. Ray Jeffrey at Florida State University, the crime analysts extend their assessment of the problem beyond data collection and analysis. Analysts routinely visit crime scenes and neighborhoods suffering high levels of criminal activity to observe the environment and conditions within the subject area to aid in an overall assessment.

To use these tools most effectively, the department needed to develop a department-wide goal of strategic thinking.

Strategic thinking was initiated to develop operational responses in the context of defined time intervals designed to meet the functional responsibilities of each level within the department. Specifically, the time frames developed by the Austin Police Department were:



- Tactical time frame—4 hours
- Operational time frame—24 hours
- Strategic time frame—28 days

The defined time intervals provide a consistent framework for analysis of crime problems and development of responses. For example, at the tactical, or line, level, a comparatively fast response is needed to deploy operational units for immediate crime problems and trends. Commanders are expected to assess crime threats on a daily basis and develop operational responses for trends that emerge, including redeployment of personnel. At the administrative level, strategic assessments are made on a monthly basis to determine department-wide needs to refocus and reallocate resources to address persistent crime trends.

Facilitating this process, a fusion center is being designed to build a strong communications pipeline to the watch commanders to meet the tactical time frame. An inherent part of the process was to take ILP to the level of having real-time actionable intelligence in addition to the strategic intelligence for forecasting.

Using these three time frames, the planning questions were:

1. What are our problems?
2. How do we need to allocate personnel?

The department realigned patrol bureaus and beats around activity and call/problem demands, rather than geography. This provided police coverage where it was needed while facilitating the analytic process. In addition, decisions on police responses were assigned in the organization to the lieutenant level.

As part of this process, the department developed Rapid Response Teams (RRT), which are facilitated by the Tactical Lieutenant working with crime analysts in each Bureau. The RRT is a leadership cadre at the regional level (not operational team) that develops plans and tactics for responding to problems.

After the Rapid Response Team meeting, the lieutenant develops an operational plan that has several fixed components:

- Overview
- Objective
- Analysis
- Target Location
- Implementation
- After Action

An overall goal in these processes is to develop a method to identify the 20 percent of the population that causes 80 percent of the crime problems.

The Austin Police Department project is still being refined; however, successes have been achieved in reducing violent crime as well as burglaries and other repetitive offenses. For example, there was a 15 percent reduction in burglary of vehicles in 2010.

Summary

The primary elements of the Austin Police Department's strategy were the use of actionable intelligence, agency restructuring around actual demand, intense analytic capabilities, and accountability at all levels of the organization. Developing the organizational flexibility to quickly identify problems as they develop and shift resources to attack the problems is the key to the Austin Police Department strategy.

Evans County, Georgia, Sheriff's Office—ILP Successes in a Rural Setting

Population: 12,000 ♦ 12 Sworn Officers

The Problem

Evans County, Georgia, located 52 miles southwest of Savannah, has a population of 12,000 people. There are four municipalities located in the county, two of which have police departments: Claxton (population 3,000, with 8 police officers) and Hagan (population 2,000, with 4 police officers). The Evans County Sheriff's Office has 12 deputies, and the Tri-Circuit Drug Task Force, a Multi-Jurisdictional Drug Task Force that is based in Claxton and serves four neighboring counties, has 7 agents.

A number of ongoing crime problems were transitioning between the municipalities and the county, but neither the sheriff's office nor the municipal police departments had a clear "picture" of the ongoing crime problems and the relationships between potential victims and offenders. While there were suspicions and assumptions about the nature of crime and offenders, the information was not being effectively shared and integrated. The problem was not an opposition to sharing information but the lack of a good mechanism or process for effective interagency communication.

The Plan

As a result, the Evans County Sheriff's Office ILP project was developed with three core components:

- Implementing ILP as a business model for identifying crime trends and offenders, as well as a mechanism to develop operational responses to the crimes.
- Structuring a privacy policy and intelligence guidelines as required by 28 CFR Part 23 with clear procedures for implementation and training for all personnel.
- Aggressive information gathering, specific analysis, and structured classifications for mass "real-time" communication paths for "actionable intelligence dissemination" to all stakeholders in the area of operations.

Secure office space to serve as the intelligence center was obtained, an intelligence analyst was hired with BJA funds, an investigative deputy was assigned to the intelligence center, and all personnel—including the Sheriff and Chief Deputy—attended both BJA- and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-funded intelligence training. Critical to the success of this effort was buy-in from not only the sheriff’s deputies but also the chiefs of police and officers in Claxton and Hagan. The support and participation of the agencies were gained surprisingly fast because the intelligence center provided useful information quickly and consistently.

To facilitate information sharing among agencies within and around Evans County, on limited budgets, the sheriff’s office provided officers with BlackBerry smartphones. This provided a cost-effective solution for transmitting critical information in a timely manner.

These agencies are like many rural police departments and sheriff’s offices around the United States. They have limited personnel, resources, and communications. These small departments change shifts without the benefit of “roll call briefings,” intelligence sharing, or information to focus patrols or analyze data to identify criminal activity. Many times, the evening officers from all three agencies arrive on shift without any knowledge about what went on in their jurisdictions or neighboring jurisdictions during the previous shift. Opportunities to prevent, disrupt, or make arrests in criminal activities are often lost, and the foundation for state and federal law enforcement to collect and receive valuable information is fragmented and not as effective as it could be.

An Evans County intelligence analyst serves all agencies and produces a number of intelligence products:

1. **E-Roll Call**—The analyst compiles a list of all calls received by each department throughout the night, along with a short narrative, and then e-mails the document to all officers.
2. **Patrol Alerts**—The analyst compiles a document listing any corroborated criminal intelligence within the jurisdictions and e-mails the document to all officers. All officers have received 28 CFR Part 23 training and have read and signed the Evans County Sheriff’s Office Privacy Policy.
3. **BOLOs**—Wanted persons who have pending warrants.
4. **Open Case Alert**—A method of communicating to deputies the “need-to-know” facts of cases under investigation by detectives.



5. **Open Source Bulletins**—Sent to all public and private sector partners to either prevent or disrupt crime.

Beyond these products, an **all-hazards report** is issued to all officers when inclement weather, dangerous incidents, or any potential public safety issue arises. All officers are members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Law Enforcement Online (LEO) and stay abreast of national trends and officer safety concerns. State, federal, and Regional Organized Crime Information Center® (ROCIC) bulletins are disseminated for education purposes.

With respect to the effectiveness of the Evans County Sheriff’s Office intelligence center, it was learned through analysis that primary crimes that were occurring throughout the county (and in adjoining counties) included theft of copper wire and associated parts from irrigation systems (these are very expensive thefts), burglaries, drugs (notably marijuana and crack), and domestic violence. There was also a growing juvenile violence problem that was akin to gang violence.

Some of the notable results are:

- Crimes that were previously treated as separate offenses have been linked through information sharing and analysis.
- The relationship with the community has strengthened, and law enforcement has received more information and tips, which are integrated for analysis.
- Crimes have been discovered that were previously unreported.
- New offenders and repeat offenders have been identified, documented, and shared among all participating agencies.
- Deputies and municipal officers are more efficient because their efforts are more directed based on the threat information provided by the analyst.
- Officer safety has increased by making officers aware of threats.

Chief Deputy Edwards stated, “We are able to produce case study after case study of success stories where arrests are made, disruptions of crime occur, and prevention of crime protected a potential victim and saved enforcement, prosecution, and incarceration dollars.” A strong statement of value derived from ILP and the analytic process came from Sheriff Tippins: “If I had to make a choice based upon my budget, I would keep our analyst and get rid of a deputy—intelligence-led policing simply makes us work smarter.”

Summary

There were some key lessons learned from the Evans County experience. Among the most critical were:

- Evans County, Georgia, clearly demonstrated that ILP has applications beyond terrorism and violence and can include crimes against property as well, which was a primary concern in Evans County.
- The [*National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan*](#) recommends that every law enforcement agency, regardless of size, develop an intelligence capacity. The Evans County Sheriff's Office took this recommendation to heart and demonstrated that ILP could be effectively implemented in a small, rural law enforcement agency.
- The value of having an analytic capability was clearly demonstrated. Perhaps one of the most profound pieces of evidence of this is the Sheriff's statement that, if necessary, he would eliminate a deputy's position in order to retain the analyst.
- New methods and approaches to crime control (in this case via ILP) can gain the support of even the most cynical employees if the initiative works and makes the work of the officers more efficient and effective.

Medford, Oregon, Police Department—Operation C.A.R.E.

Population: 76,860 ♦ 103 Sworn Officers

The Problem

Medford, Oregon, is a city of 76,860 located in southwest Oregon just north of the California state line. An upper-income retirement community, the city nevertheless has an unemployment rate of 13 percent and an above-average school dropout rate. Like many other communities, Medford has experienced a rising gang problem. More important is the perception that there is a growing disconnection between many of the citizens of Medford and City Hall.

Recognizing the link between citizen satisfaction and successful crime reduction, the Medford Police Department established goals aimed at improving the quality of life for its citizens through community problem solving, crime prevention strategies, and high clearance rates.

Prior to initiating a plan, the Medford Police Department conducted an intensive statistical analysis of the community. Based on crime data and police calls for service, Medford was divided into seven fixed beats. Patrol assignments, however, were allocated according to demand.

The Medford Police Department uses 12-hour shifts. By varying shift assignments, Medford was able to match resource allocation to demand. The police department then conducted the first of what was to become a routine neighborhood assessment by conducting a neighborhood-walk survey. What was known as the Liberty Park Project established the foundation for Operation Community Awareness Rejuvenation Effort (C.A.R.E.). Liberty Park was selected because of the perception that the people of this neighborhood felt neglected and disenfranchised.

The survey was successful, providing valuable information from which the department was able to engage other social service organizations in a cooperative effort to resolve problems within the neighborhood. Examples of the types of situations identified in Liberty Park include a blind man living alone in a house with exposed electrical wiring who needed help and a mentally ill woman and her teenage daughter who had not been out of the house in over a year.

The Plan

The operational plan initiated by the Medford Police Department might be called total immersion in the community. Officers are expected to be community problem solvers, and everyone has an electronic list of community resources available to address virtually any problem encountered.

Recognizing that officers need ready access to information relevant to problems in their area or specific calls for service, the Tactical Information Unit (TIU) provides a steady source of historical and real-time information for each component of the department.

A primary principle of the plan is crime prevention and effective response. Investigations are conducted with maximum effort. Major crimes, such as homicide, often have as many as 13 officers assigned to a single case during the critical first 24 hours. Moreover, realizing that few criminals specialize in the type of crime they commit, the department continually looks for linkages between crimes and suspects. The strategy has been so successful that the Medford Police Department boasts a clearance rate for all crimes in excess of 80 percent for the last three years.

As part of the overall strategy for crime reduction and community betterment, the Medford Police Department initiated the following programs:

- Medford Area Drug Gang Enforcement team (MADGE)—Given the strong connection between gangs and drug trafficking, combining the drug and gang units from different agencies into a single unit was a clear choice. The new unit, known as MADGE, works closely with the TIU and surrounding communities to track and interdict the traffic in illicit drugs and to suppress illegal gang activity.
- School Resource Officers (SRO)—The pulse of the community can be easily gauged through contacts with the children. The police department assigns SROs to every school in the community on a full-time basis. Close contact with children, especially teenagers, allows officers to detect problems as they develop.
- Sex Offender Program—The Medford Police Department is committed to preventing sexual victimization of its citizens. Officers strictly enforce laws and rules regarding sex offender registration. Medford police officers arrest more registered sex offenders for not complying with their registration requirements than do officers in any other city in the state.
- Crime Stoppers—Officers aggressively promote crime prevention strategies and tactics. Partnering with private business and the news media, the department keeps its citizens abreast of potential threats from criminals and encourages communication between the citizens and the police department.
- Southern Oregon Fraud And Security Team (SOFAST)—A unique program initiated by the department, SOFAST was initially created by an officer to address financial crimes in the community. SOFAST is a partnership among financial institutions, large retailers, and law enforcement. The program was eventually institutionalized and is now incorporated as part of the department's Financial Investigative Section, focusing on financial crimes perpetrated against members of the community and the community's

businesses. Emphasis is placed on victimization of the elderly. Key to the program's success is the relationship among the police, financial institutions, and the business community.

- Neighborhood Watch and Volunteers—Medford currently has 7,000 members in Neighborhood Watch, with 300 captains. There is a Web-based newsletter published monthly with regular bulletins. Moreover, in the first six months of 2010, volunteers provided more than 3,700 hours of support to a variety of city functions.
- Parole/Probation and Oregon Liquor Control Commission (OLCC) Partnerships—The police department routinely conducts parole/probation audits and bar checks to determine whether any of the patrons are violating their terms of probation or parole. The Medford Police Department has partnered with community corrections personnel to aggressively ensure that high-risk individuals under correctional supervision are in compliance with court-mandated restrictions.
- Rules of the Road and On the Beat—Partnering with local media, the Medford Police Department is involved in two programs designed to help citizens understand state and local laws as well as the subtle nuances of police work. Both programs have been well-received by the public.
- Beat Management—Patrol officers are held accountable for crime and livability issues in their assigned beats. A monthly report is generated that shows residential locations in which five or more calls for service were generated. The beat officers, under the supervision of a beat sergeant, are expected to work together to develop a solution to the problem that addresses the underlying issues and concerns, resulting in fewer resident calls for service.
- Police Advisory Committee—The Medford Police Department created a Police Advisory Committee made up of local citizens that represent a cross-section of the community. The purpose is to receive input from community leaders and to provide a forum to address police and community issues.

The Medford Police Department's promotions, specialty assignments, and awards programs are based on community connectivity, problem-solving abilities, and the work an employee has done that impacted crime and/or improved neighborhood livability. These programs have contributed to building a culture of continuous improvement and great customer service.

Information collection and the reliance on analysis are more than just an initiative within the Medford Police Department; they are part of the culture. One artifact of this culture of information sharing is that all functions of the department appear to proactively share information with other units as a matter of course, not as an exceptional activity.

Located at the core of the department are two analysts who both proactively develop leads and work in response to specific inquiries from investigators and uniformed officers alike.

Summary

The Medford Police Department has created an information sharing environment that embraces collaboration with its community and regional law enforcement agencies. Specific problems have been addressed with special programs, some of which are unique. Tying it all together is the Tactical Information Unit, which serves as both a clearinghouse for information as well as a crime analysis unit.

When all of these efforts are combined, the programs initiated by the Medford Police Department represent a total immersion of law enforcement and social services into the community. The commitment to community involvement and information sharing has produced an environment of cooperation between the police and their constituents rarely seen in contemporary society. Boasting approval ratings of well above 90 percent, coupled with clearance rates for all crimes in excess of 80 percent, the Medford Police Department level of success is truly astounding.

Chief Randy Schoen says: “Based on performance indicators, Medford is the most productive agency in Oregon. It is not a ‘hug and release’ police department.”

Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Police Department—Safe Streets Initiative

Population: 603,338 ♦ 1,905 sworn officers

The Problem

Like many other large urban areas, Milwaukee has witnessed increased violence related to gang activity. Over the past decade, the area has been plagued with homicides, aggravated assaults, and drive-by shootings, as well as an array of other violent crimes.

In just more than five years, overall violent crime increased 46 percent, while aggravated assault almost doubled at 92 percent. By 2004, the homicide rate in Milwaukee had surpassed that of New York City, jumping from 88 murders in 2004 to 122 in 2005. A large portion of these dramatic increases was due to a rising gang population combined with an increased aggressiveness by gangs in general.

Compounding the problem were limited technical and policy processes for effective information sharing. Information existed, but the agency information infrastructure either did not get actionable intelligence to the right people or did not get it there in a timely manner. While relationships between adjacent jurisdictions were good, collaboration and information sharing were inconsistent.

Addressing the rising levels of violent crime required new ideas and new technology. Even though relationships among Milwaukee officers and other state, local, and federal agencies were positive, communication and cooperation needed to improve. There was a desperate need for actionable intelligence and a more flexible response to crime-related conditions throughout the city.

The Plan

After a thorough assessment of the problem, the command staff of the Milwaukee Police Department established three goals:

- Reduce homicides and shootings through continual assessment.
- Reduce violence and gang crime through enhanced intelligence-led policing.
- Enhance public safety through hot-spot enforcement.

To accomplish these goals, the Milwaukee Police Department identified four key components of the Safe Streets Initiative. The components identified and implemented were:

1. Adapting an intelligence-led policing model to focus information collection, analysis, and dissemination.

2. Utilizing the Wisconsin Justice Information Sharing (WJIS) network to serve as a secure platform for the ILP model.
3. Implementing the Milwaukee Homicide Review initiative to provide in-depth analysis of homicides. This is a contracted service that provides analytical assessment of all homicides occurring in Milwaukee. The goal of this service is to provide a better understanding of the nature of homicide and firearm violence through strategic problem analysis, to develop innovative responses to the problem of homicide and firearm violence, and to strategically focus limited enforcement and intervention activities on identifiable risks.



4. Using overtime enforcement to provide added personnel to areas identified as “hot spots.”

Specific activities related to these components included crime analysis-driven decision making, regular CompStat meetings, information sharing, and strategy development.

The crime analysis unit focuses on developing crime problems and provides both assessments of crime trends and timely information on criminal activity and crime hot spots. Regular CompStat-type meetings are held, via computer linkages and teleconferencing, involving all district commanders along with the command staff.

As vital as these activities were, the most critical changes occurred on the street. The Milwaukee Police Department created and deployed two Neighborhood Task Forces (NTFs). One task force was deployed on the North Side of the city and one on the South Side. Each NTF mirrored a fully staffed district with its own uniformed patrol, investigators, and support. Based on careful analysis of criminal episodes and crime trends, an NTF could be deployed in any section of the city to increase the available resources in the area where they were most needed.

As with other urban law enforcement agencies, Milwaukee also observed the connection between auto theft and other criminal activity. By evaluating the auto theft patterns, the Milwaukee Police Department identified automobiles most at risk by type, geographic area, and time of day. Possessing this information, the police department instituted an aggressive traffic enforcement program targeting at-risk vehicles. Traffic stops per month increased from an average of 1,000 stops to 10,000 stops. This occurred with no increase in the number of citations issued and with no change in the number of citizen complaints.

Beyond stopping at-risk vehicles, officers were tasked with identifying behavioral characteristics indicative of someone carrying a weapon and conducting lawful searches based

on probable cause or permission. The emphasis was on getting weapons, especially firearms, off the street.

Officers were also encouraged to park their cars and conduct foot patrol, otherwise referred to as “walk and talk,” to visit with pedestrians, shopkeepers, and anyone willing to visit with the officer. Again, the target was weapons.

The success rate was phenomenal. Milwaukee saw a major reduction in crime, with a remarkable 60 percent drop in murders of young African-American males, the most at-risk group in the United States.

Summary

Key features of the ILP component of the Milwaukee Safe Streets Initiative included expanded information-gathering capabilities and enhanced analytic capabilities, with the purpose of timely dissemination of actionable intelligence. To make optimum use of the intelligence, the Milwaukee Police Department created Neighborhood Task Forces to respond to changing conditions and augment districts with special needs.

Officer accountability was a large part of the plan, with officers being tasked to aggressively target at-risk vehicles and proactively seek to remove weapons from the streets of Milwaukee.

In addition, Milwaukee enhanced its investigative and analytic capabilities through collaboration and cooperation with state, local, and federal agencies in the region. There was a focused effort to improve the relationships between the police department and the public. The Milwaukee Police Department turned good relationships into true partnerships, and as much as any other innovation, this was a key to its success.

Palm Beach County, Florida, Sheriff's Office—Gangs as Criminal Enterprises

Population: 1,286,461 ♦ 1,569 Sworn Officers ♦ 23 Municipal Police Departments

The Problem

Beset with a proliferation of gangs, Palm Beach County, Florida, was inundated by an increase in homicides and violent crimes. The problem was compounded by the fact that many local law enforcement administrators were unwilling to acknowledge a gang problem in their jurisdiction even though the area was experiencing a rash of strong-arm robberies and drive-by shootings with AK-47s (referred to by gang members as “choppers”). When police body armor became the target of thefts and the more violent gangs showed no fear of the police and, in fact, demonstrated a willingness to engage officers in armed combat at the slightest provocation, it was clear attitudes and procedures had to change.

Agency administrators began to realize that they could no longer deny the reality of gangs and that, more important, this was not a battle which individual agencies could fight alone. As the crime data was analyzed, it became clear that the vast majority of violent crime was associated, in some form, with gang activities. To address that problem, the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office developed the Violent Crime/Gang Enforcement Strategy.

The Plan

The core of the strategy centered on the development of the multiagency Violent Crimes Task Force (VCTF). The VCTF is an elite unit made up of area officers who are committed to the philosophy of the unit and willing to expend the time and energy needed to make the plan work. Recognizing that an aggressive law enforcement unit, such as this task force, has the potential for poor public relations, agency administrators instituted a three-tiered management approach aimed at maintaining the focus in a manner acceptable to the community. This included a comprehensive training program that all task force members were required to complete prior to becoming a task force member, a tight chain of command to maintain unit integrity and focus, and close supervision that left no room for free-lance law enforcement. This approach resulted in a high level of buy-in by cooperating agencies and unit personnel that produced a working environment with few complaints by either officers or citizens.

A high-energy unit employing strategies and tactics based on actionable intelligence and applying constant pressure on key gang members was the foundation of the plan. The core of the VCTF employed five components:

- **Multiagency investigative efforts**—In particular, a partnership with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) served an important role for investigating and prosecuting offenders on gun law violations. Moreover, ATF provided lab support for DNA comparisons. Local law enforcement, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), and federal agencies beyond the ATF bought into the

concept and participated with both personnel and resources. It must be stressed that while the sheriff's office is the lead agency, this is a true collaborative effort with a high level of commitment by participating agencies.



- **Intelligence**—Intelligence, analysis, and data sharing were critical, particularly through the “Virtual Fusion Center,” which is essentially a single SharePoint portal focused on South Florida crime issues and includes participation by state, local, and federal law enforcement. Emphasis was placed on non-task force officers to obtain as much quality information as possible from their interactions with the community and to make every effort to get relevant information into the fusion center for sound operational decisions and deployment strategies.
- **Community policing**—Community-policing initiatives were a critical element of the process. The need for two-way communication between law enforcement and the community was clear in order for law enforcement to build rapport and trust with residents and obtain as much information as possible about offenders and crimes. Similarly, law enforcement relied on community information to aid in directing enforcement and suppression efforts. Law enforcement met consistently with community members to educate them about crime trends and to keep the channels of communication open. Going beyond crime-related discussions, the sheriff's office also engaged the community in non-crime-related activities. Key among these was the Police Athletic League (PAL), which provides positive interaction between law enforcement and the area youths.
- **Suppression/enforcement**—As information is developed about criminals and threats via the multiagency teams, intelligence, and community input, aggressive enforcement actions are used to arrest offenders. “Aggressive” means full enforcement of the law; however, arrests are made by strategically removing offenders from neighborhoods rather than using techniques such as street sweeps. Similarly, when criminal generators were identified—such as open-air drug markets—the sheriff's street-level enforcement teams were deployed to suppress the crime. All of these initiatives are highly dependent on both intelligence and community input. Each effort is also conducted in a manner designed to gain community support and minimize disruption of lawful routine activities.

- **Prosecution**—The prosecutor is a full partner in this task force. Providing legal advice as well as initiating prosecutions with the objective of obtaining maximum sentences for hard-core gang members, the prosecutor’s office is a vital component of the overall plan. There has to be a true integration between agencies at all levels of government and the prosecutor’s office on a daily basis for the partnership to be successful. This was reinforced by the local state attorney, who stated that the prosecutor must spend as much time at the sheriff’s office as at the prosecutor’s office.

Because so much of the violence in Palm Beach County was associated with drug trafficking by gangs, the task force decided to take a comprehensive approach to deal with the gangs through the use of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. This required exhaustive information collection through the intelligence process as well as detailed cooperation with the state attorney’s office in order to develop and prosecute cases.

In many ways, this integrated approach appears not only logical but also simple. However, the initiative required significant resocialization of all partner personnel, changes in policy, and both patience and commitment to make the plan work effectively. The results from initial assessments in Palm Beach County indicate success. Thus far, seven violent criminal gangs have been dismantled, with their members serving lengthy prison sentences. Most noteworthy, over a four-year period, gang-related homicides dropped by 50 percent.

Summary

Facing rising gang violence, the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office initiated the multiagency Violent Crimes Task Force. This team is composed of officers from surrounding state, local, and federal law enforcement agencies. The task force is highly trained and closely supervised. Using actionable intelligence and working in conjunction with the prosecutor’s office, the task force targeted violent gang members using every available legal tool, including the RICO Act. While the geographic and demographic characteristics of Palm Beach County have evolved to make the western portion of the county a location that attracts potential gang recruits, the initial results of the VCTF are encouraging.

Phoenix, Arizona, Police Department—Resolving a Gang Resurgence

Population: 1,579,839 ♦ 3,361 Sworn Officers ♦ 8 Stations

The Problem

Phoenix, Arizona, witnessed a startling increase in homicides and violent crime. Becoming known as the kidnapping capital of North America, Phoenix was faced with a level of gang activity unparalleled in the United States. The magnitude of the problem was highlighted by the evolution of the use of kidnapping and home invasion as an economic strategy by criminals both within and outside of gangs. The problem was compounded by a fact that is all too commonly heard around the country: some law enforcement administrators were unwilling to acknowledge a gang problem in their jurisdiction.

Further complicating the problem was the fact that deconfliction strategies had limited success. In 2005, the Mexican Mafia posed the greatest threat to the area. In a number of cases, both the Phoenix Police Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) discovered that they were working the same cases without cooperation, creating unnecessary conflict. Moreover, the absence of a coordinated strategy resulted in ineffective investigations. It was estimated that only three out of five investigations went forward for prosecution.

Agency administrators began to recognize the presence of gangs in their communities and the threat they posed. More important, each agency realized that this was not a fight individual agencies could wage alone. As the crime data was analyzed, it became clear that the vast majority of violent crime was associated, in some form, with illegal drug trafficking. To address that problem, the Phoenix Police Department, the FBI, and roughly 30 percent of the adjacent law enforcement agencies met to design and implement a strategy.

The Plan

The focus of the strategy centered on identifying the primary gangs responsible for the majority of the violence. Analysts with the Phoenix Gang Task Force identified four criteria to be used to identify gangs to be targeted. These were:

1. Size of the gang.
2. Level of activity involving drug trafficking.
3. Level of violence demonstrated by gang members.
4. Structural stability within the gang as determined by its organized command and control.

Using this criteria, surrounding agencies were asked to identify primary gangs within their jurisdictions. The local agencies identified five gangs for special attention. Each gang was assigned to a designated lead agency. The lead agencies were responsible for acting as a clearinghouse for information related to that gang. In addition, the task force established strategies for identifying key actors within each gang set and providing that information to officers in all jurisdictions in order to apply increased enforcement pressure on these individuals.



Unique features of gang activity in the Phoenix area consist of the following:

- The goal of many young Hispanic men is to join the Mexican Mafia. Membership is obtained through associations in prison.
- Jail communication is a key feature of gang activity within the Mexican Mafia, with extensive use of telephone numbers acquired with false identification, referred to as “burnout lines.”
- While most gangs are primarily racial in membership, there has been an evolution of hybrid gangs heavily involved in home invasions and “drug rips,” in which the criminals involved in robberies also target each other. Several gangs and their members have left their traditional gang boundaries because of housing and economic issues, making it extremely difficult to keep track of their movements and exposing areas of the city to a level of gang violence that has not been seen before.

To confront the growing gang problem, the Phoenix Police Department and its partners initiated the following efforts:

- **Multiagency investigative efforts**—In particular, a partnership with the FBI and surrounding agencies united the effort, with a high level of commitment by participating agencies. The key players in this endeavor were the Phoenix chief of police and the local FBI Special Agent in Charge. These two were instrumental in creating the task force and the atmosphere of cooperation that was the hallmark of the task force throughout their tenure.
- **Intelligence**—Intelligence, analysis, and data sharing were critical. Using GangNET, a real-time database designed to track gang members and activities, the task force provided up-to-date information to cooperating agencies. Also, monthly meetings were held among representatives of active task force supporters to maintain momentum and share information. In

addition, the lead agencies were held accountable to provide real results and ensure that the investigations were moving forward in a positive direction.

- **Suppression/enforcement**—As information was developed about criminals and threats via the multiagency teams, intelligence, and community input, aggressive enforcement actions were used to arrest offenders.

Because so much of the violence in Phoenix was associated with drug trafficking by gangs, the task force implemented a comprehensive intelligence-led approach to deal with the gangs. This required exhaustive information collection through the intelligence process as well as detailed cooperation with the local county attorney's and state attorney's offices in order to develop and prosecute cases.

The first challenge to make this approach work was the creation of trusted partnerships among law enforcement agencies. With these partnerships in place, the next challenge was to provide training and guidance to all personnel across the partnering agencies so that officers and investigators worked as a cohesive team in their new roles.

Summary

Facing rising gang violence, the Phoenix Police Department created a task force of officers from surrounding state, local, and federal law enforcement agencies. The task force was very cooperative and highly coordinated. Using actionable intelligence and working in conjunction with the prosecutor's office, the task force targeted violent gang members using every available tactical and legal tool. The result led to the combination of resources to conduct four long-term investigations in two years. These investigations led to the arrests of more than 400 gang members and their associates from more than 40 different gang sets for crimes including, but not limited to, homicide, kidnapping, aggravated assault, robbery (home invasions), drug trafficking, illegal control of a criminal enterprise, and assisting a criminal street gang.

Unfortunately, a number of events occurred to limit the effectiveness of the gang task force after its first two years of existence. First, a change of command in the both the Phoenix Police Department and local FBI office brought a change in priorities. Moreover, the budget crisis facing the Phoenix Police Department as well as surrounding agencies reduced the access to resources for the task force. It is estimated, for example, that wiretaps directed at gangs cost approximately \$100,000 per month. This is due to the number of lines and number of officers necessary to monitor the wiretaps. The high cost of gang suppression is in conflict with the fiscal realities of the Phoenix Police Department.

The result of these changes is that while still active, the gang task force has seen a drop in effectiveness. It remains to be seen what the future holds, but while it was at full strength, the Phoenix Gang Task Force demonstrated a high level of success.

Richmond, Virginia, Police Department—An Integrated Approach to Homicide Investigations

Population: 202,002

The Problem

The city of Richmond, Virginia, experienced an increase in homicides and violent crime. Beyond reported crime, there was supposition that an increase in some violent crime—such as drug-related robberies—was going unreported.

The police department decided to reengineer its approach to violence reduction by building on past success and adding new components. It wanted to go beyond making arrests and both resolve causes of violence and develop initiatives to prevent future violence.

One of the clear successes of the Richmond Police Department was its community-policing initiatives. The Richmond Police Department felt that it could build on its relationship with the community but that this needed to be expanded and integrated with other initiatives. Similarly, the Richmond Police Department had preliminary successes with intelligence-led policing (ILP) but believed it could be more successful by making the analysis more robust and targeted and by integrating ILP with other programmatic initiatives.

The Plan

Relying on the fundamental premise that “If you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it,” the police department began performing a detailed analysis of the crime problem in Richmond. While it was immediately apparent that the number of homicides was unusually high, the root of the problem appeared to be violence associated with the drug trade, much of which was resulting in homicide. Hence, any resolution had to focus on drug-related violence, neighborhood disputes with a nexus to gangs, and gun crime reduction. Similarly, in order to sustain a lowered number of homicides, the police department wanted to develop initiatives to increase convictions and stop violence before it resulted in homicides. These principles resulted in several initiatives.

The Focus Mission Team (FMT)—The FMT is a proactive crime focus initiative driven by analysts. The analysts work closely with sworn officers and provide high-quality, substantive analysis using diverse analytic tools and mapping to better understand crime trends, circumstances of criminal incidents, and forecasts of probable future violence. Stepping beyond the traditional analysts’ role, the Richmond Police Department analysts will often go to crime scenes with investigating officers as well as meet with community members. These activities provide new information and context to aid the analysts in providing more robust analytic products.

Directed patrol—The police department also began an aggressive directed patrol initiative that is based on the analytic products. The more robust analysis of crime data permitted the development of more focused, directed Reducing Crime Through Intelligence-Led

Policing patrol initiatives, which aided in the prevention of crime and intervention in potential gang and drug activities.

- Retaliation Assessment Tool (RAT)—When a homicide/aggravated assault occurs, there is a relentless follow-up to examine all aspects of the crime. A particularly unique aspect of follow-up is the RAT, notably for those crimes with a nexus to gangs. This is used for all homicides and aggravated assaults that have a high potential for retaliation to make an analysis about the threat to victims of possible retaliation. Police work closely with potential victims in order to prevent crime retaliation from occurring. Since aggravated assault victims often know their attacker and the friends and family of homicide victims often know who committed the homicide, retaliation is a significant issue that must be addressed for preventing future violence.
- Cooperative Violence Reduction Partnership (CVRP)—Perhaps one of the most critical initiatives is the CVRP, which is a partnership (in place since 2005) among local and federal law enforcement, prosecutors, and corrections. The CVRP has met every 45 days since 2005 to review violent crime trends and patterns and major cases and to determine how best to deploy the Partnership’s collective resources to decrease violent crime. Prosecutors are part of community policing and are assigned to each precinct. There is a clear and open line of communication between prosecutors and both law enforcement and community members to enhance prosecution of cases. Similarly, the Richmond Police Department works closely with federal agencies, particularly ATF, as a team in a collaborative effort to reduce violent crime.
- Biweekly Intelligence Meetings—Every other week, members of the Senior Command Staff; Major Crime Division supervisors and detectives; precinct detective supervisors and detectives; officers; crime analysts and representatives from other local, state, and federal law enforcement; and prosecutors meet to review intelligence relating to violent crime (particularly robberies) in the city in an effort to develop links between cases. This is yet another example of the outstanding collaborative initiatives in Richmond focused on violent crime.
- Community Buy-In—Communication with the community was important to gain community trust, which increased cooperation in identifying suspects and in prosecutions. From a community-policing perspective, there is a philosophy of recommitment and communication. The Richmond Police



Department hosted or participated in numerous meetings with citizens, reaching an average of 600 to 700 meetings annually.

- **Rapid Engagement of Support in the Event of Trauma (R.E.S.E.T)**—“The premise behind Community R.E.S.E.T. is to restore a community to its level of normalcy after a homicide, a shooting, a traffic accident, or any traumatic event that disrupts the daily life of that neighborhood,” Chief Bryan Norwood said. “But the programs mean nothing without the people. We’ve got to be together and work together on all of this to ensure our success continues.” R.E.S.E.T. brings together not only law enforcement but also mental health professionals after traumatic events in an effort to canvass the neighborhood where the event occurred and offer the necessary support to help the citizens deal with the trauma.
- **Command Staff Neighborhood Walks**—Once a month, the entire Command Staff visits a site of recent criminal activity, accompanied by other city partner agencies as well as community partners, including faith leaders. The group provides residents with important information about their Police Sector and resources in the neighborhood and solicits their feedback about police service and any information related to criminal activity in their neighborhood.
- **Homicide Family Management Initiative**—Various social services agencies, the prosecutors and victim/witness liaisons in the Office of the Commonwealth’s Attorney, and detectives investigating a homicide work closely with members of the victim’s family to collect information for the investigation and to help the family recover from the trauma of victimization. This has increased the amount of information obtained from the family, often leading to faster arrest. An offshoot of this program is that there have been fewer complaints from victims’ family members about investigative and prosecutorial actions. One of the challenges to overcome is resocializing detectives to make Reducing Crime Through Intelligence-Led Policing a community orientation—this was a different role for detectives, which initially met with some resistance.
- **Homicide Support Group**—Richmond’s Homicide Support Group offers families an environment for families to share experiences, exchange information, and give and receive support. It is a cohesive effort to deviate from the traditional counseling sessions with more of a community-involvement approach to healing, such as inviting representatives from various organizations to speak, planting flowers, holding summer barbecues, and sponsoring toy drives during the holidays. The response has been overwhelming. The group, sanctioned and supported by both the leadership of the Richmond Police Department and the Richmond Commonwealth’s Attorney, is composed of family members of homicide victims, homicide detectives/supervisors, civilian Richmond Police Department employees, and internal/external partners. It meets routinely and has not only grown in terms

of attendance but has also been the subject of many inquiries and visits from interested legal, legislative, and concerned professionals throughout the commonwealth. Survivors and group members help each other to feel less isolated by connecting with others who share a loss. They help each other to promote change, growth, and restoration to lives devastated by tragic loss.

- **Gang Reduction and Intervention Program (GRIP)**—A combined effort of federal, state, and local agencies, GRIP targets criminally active gang members. Relentless pressure on the gangs by all sectors of the cooperating agencies has severely limited gang member activities.
- **Use of Technology**—Technology is so rampant and relevant in the efforts of the Richmond Police Department to detect, prevent, and investigate crime that it would be impossible to cover the gamut of its technological innovations, but one worth mentioning is its records management system—PISTOL. PISTOL allows for the full integration of incidents, names, addresses, wanted persons, and other information into a single database that can be used to track, map, analyze, and even predict criminal behavior, patterns, and suspects. PISTOL is an integral part of the department’s crime-fighting/reduction efforts.
- **Clarity of Purpose**—The department clarified expectations through reorganization or mission control. Because homicide investigation is a specialty in itself, four dedicated homicide investigation teams were created. Equally important, the department expanded the focus of the drug units. Recognizing that the traffic in illicit drugs brings many diverse criminal activities into play, the department tasked the drug unit with expanding its investigations beyond drugs to look at any and all related crimes and suspect linkages, with special emphasis on violent crimes.

Evidence of the successes of these initiatives is a consistent reduction of violent crime, including a significant reduction of homicides, high closure rates on crimes, and 85 to 95 percent conviction rates on violent crime. Richmond Police Department initiatives focus on violence reduction, not just enforcement for enforcement’s sake. Officers are rewarded for solving problems in the community rather than for number of citations or arrests.

The Richmond Police Department’s commitment to community involvement is not mere lip service. According to Chief Norwood: “This department infuses community policing in every aspect of what we do.” The department’s high clearance rates reflect the resulting trust that has been created in Richmond. The department typically boasts a homicide clearance rate well in excess of the national average. In 2010, the department’s homicide clearance rate was 83 percent. In fact, the Homicide Family Management Initiative has already been credited with solving three cold cases. Clearly, the partnership among the Richmond Police Department, the community, and adjoining agencies is working.



Summary

The Richmond Police Department rebuilt itself upon an established foundation of community-oriented policing. Believing that addressing the causes of crime has a long-term impact on the quality of life, the police department initiated several related activities. It upgraded its already impressive crime analysis unit with state-of-the-art software. The police department established close relationships with state, local, and federal agencies in the area and, using actionable intelligence, focused the department's resources on violent crime and its causes.

Commitment from management, community support, collaborative problem solving, actionable intelligence, clear goals, and accountability are the cornerstones of the Richmond Police Department strategy. Its success can be seen in the results.

“This department infuses community policing in every aspect of what we do.”
—Chief Bryan T. Norwood, Chief of Police

San Diego, California, Police Department—West Coast Offense

Population: 1,223,400 ♦ 9 Divisions

The Problem

San Diego, California, is a city with a long-standing presence of gangs. Sitting astride Interstate 5 and adjacent to the Mexican border, San Diego has characteristics that make it attractive to criminal enterprises. By 2007, it became increasingly clear that the amount of crime activity initiated by the Asian gangs superseded the ongoing activity by Hispanic gangs in levels of violence per capita gang crime. The San Diego police command recognized that a more organized approach was needed and implemented an intelligence-based plan that is referred to in San Diego as the “West Coast Offense.”

To initiate this plan, a number of changes had to occur within the police department. First, the administration recognized that better information was needed, and this information required a higher level of analysis and sharing. Second, detectives, analysts, and gang investigators needed a much closer working relationship. Third, attacking gangs also required a closer working relationship with federal agencies, the prosecutor’s office, and probation and parole agencies.

The detectives and officers assigned to the Asian gangs were given a mandate to reduce the levels of violence associated with gang activity, but with each detective transfer out of the unit, information about the gangs and contacts was lost. Enforcement activity was random and uncoordinated. There was no strategic goal in place.

Past strategies had included a number of innovations. The police department had initiated several problem-oriented policing programs. There had been programs involving community-driven intervention, abatements, injunctions, and evictions. The department had created special investigative teams and unveiled a campaign of tough enforcement. All had failed to stem the tide of violence. The challenge became clear. Despite the arrests of gang members for various crimes, gang leaders were not being identified and apprehended. This was essential for success since the leaders were the ones giving gang members direction and ensuring that the gangs posed an ongoing threat. Similarly, the gangs still maintained an arsenal of firearms. The gangs appeared to be acting with impunity.

The problem was obvious to the San Diego Police Department but difficult to solve. While many gangs have hundreds of members and any of the members may occasionally engage in violent activity, virtually all gangs have only a few leaders and a small number of active killers. The San Diego Police Department referred to these as the “shot callers” and “shooters.”

The “shot callers” appeared to be mostly a small group of first-generation leaders. They were highly motivated and not susceptible to injunctions or geographic probation. They were also adept at recruiting young members and were on the verge of drawing other gang sets into alliances. They used young members to work for the gang and used violence or threats to keep

them in line. Those members with criminal histories did not carry weapons or keep them at their residences. They used safe houses, maintained by individuals without criminal histories, as armories.



The “shooters” became relatively easy to identify by their chosen street names: “killer,” “hit man,” “gunner,” etc. These individuals, it was reasoned, were involved in violent activities on a regular basis and thus constituted the foundation of violence that permeated the gang. As a general rule, it was believed that 16 percent of the members were responsible for 47 percent of the crime. The problem, therefore, was to get this 16 percent off the street.

The Plan

The San Diego Police Department plan is a combination of criminal intelligence, problem solving, proactive enforcement, situational crime prevention, and technology to determine the best method to prevent or stop recalcitrant crime. It is referred to as the “West Coast Offense” because it is a flexible, fast, and well-thought-out method of scoring quickly and often.

Successfully neutralizing these individuals required first acquiring positive identification of individuals, many of whom, if known to police, were known only by street names.

The police department needed intelligence. To get that intelligence, it needed informants. Rejecting the time-worn belief that Asian gang members would not talk to the police, the gang unit began a concentrated effort to enlist informants. Using the same techniques for informant development that have worked with criminals of all types and all eras, members of the gang unit found that Asian gang members are like other criminals. Within a year, the number of active informants had risen from 4 to 60, some of which were highly placed in the gang.

The plan worked; the police were able to identify the major players in the gang set. With that information, uniformed patrol officers were tasked with targeting these individuals for enforcement.

The strategy was simple, but elegant. The San Diego Police Department mobilized each element of the department in a coordinated effort to put unrelenting pressure on key gang members. Rather than working in isolation as past gang units had done, the San Diego Police Department gang unit collaborated with other investigative units, uniformed patrol, and officers in adjacent jurisdictions at all levels of government to share information and develop plans. Every police officer in the San Diego area had a single focus: get the shot callers and shooters off the street.

The change in the department gang philosophy was straightforward but dramatic. First, there was a clear mandate to learn about gang sets in order to understand their structure and weaknesses. Second, it was recognized that not every officer is suited to work gang investigations; those officers not up to the task were transferred to other units. Next, the unit rapidly and radically expanded its information sources. Every possible scrap of information was brought into play. This included not only police records but community resources and gang and neighborhood family interviews—any piece of information, no matter how seemingly inconsequential. The department reviewed academic research and problem-oriented policing projects. Finally and most important, the commitment of the gang unit changed—it was no longer deemed a success to simply arrest gang members. Rather, the goal was to eliminate gangs by focusing on their leadership.

The results were dramatic. Gang-related violence, which accounts for around 35 percent of San Diego’s homicides, declined dramatically. Additionally, a number of the most violent gang sets were deactivated. It became obvious that when the leadership of the gang set was disrupted, the set would sometimes fall apart.

Summary

The San Diego ILP strategy was designed using specific themes:

- Target the most serious and prolific offenders—more specifically, identify and target shot callers and shooters.
- Triage crime for further investigations—rather than investigate a crime as though it occurred in a vacuum, look for relationships with other crimes and possible connections with other criminals.
- Make greater use of surveillance and informants—the department often knows the key individuals and groups and knows where they live.
- Position intelligence closer to decisionmakers—administrative, strategic, and tactical decision making should be based on accurate information. Actionable intelligence must get to decisionmakers at all levels of the organization in a timely manner.
- Focus on hot people, times, locations, and property—16 percent of gang members are responsible for 47 percent of the crime, most of which occurs within focused geographic areas during identifiable times. This is where law enforcement activity must be directed.

Finally, interagency cooperation and community support are vital to achieve success. The San Diego Police Department redefined itself, and the results are strikingly positive.

San Francisco, California, Police Department—A New Reliance on Analysis

Population: 843,402 ♦ 2,339 Sworn Officers

The Problem

As one of the more unique cities in the United States, San Francisco also has unique problems. Situated on the San Francisco peninsula, which separates San Francisco Bay from the Pacific Ocean, the city of San Francisco is a cultural center that draws people from all over the world. Unfortunately, San Francisco also attracts criminals from a variety of areas, drawn by the prospect of a target-rich environment.

Recognizing that traditional police methods were insufficient, the San Francisco Police Department commenced a process to identify problem areas through the use of reorganized response areas based on data analysis.

To determine the factors related to violence, a study of gun violence in San Francisco was commissioned. The study revealed the following facts:

1. A limited number of violent offenders are responsible for most of the gun violence.
2. Many of the victims and witnesses are reluctant to come forward because of the legitimate fear of retaliation.
3. Many of the suspects and victims had extensive criminal histories. Many suspects and victims are on probation or parole.
4. Violent crime is extremely concentrated in San Francisco.
5. Forty-five to fifty percent of the violent crime in San Francisco occurs in less than two percent of the neighborhoods.

The Plan

Using the information derived from statistical analysis of crime patterns and coupled with the information derived from the study, effective February 4, 2008, the police department divided the city of San Francisco into five zones. The zones were identified as “hot spots” of violence located in or adjacent to six police districts. The violence reduction strategy then implemented was known by the acronym P.I.E.—prevention, intervention, enforcement. The strategy focused on both target locations and criminally active individuals.

A key portion of the strategy was the strategic employment of resources and personnel into the areas identified as hot spots. This tactic, a form of saturation patrol referred to by officers as “cops on the dots,” matched officer deployment with criminal activity. Extra

attention was focused on Market Street. By analyzing the patterns of criminal activity, the San Francisco Police Department discovered a major problem with criminals from outside the city of San Francisco. A number of individuals, intent on criminal activity, were using various forms of mass transit to enter the city and exiting onto Market Street. It was along this corridor that an extensive amount of criminal activity was occurring. The initial plan targeted this corridor for police saturation and was named the “Mid-Market Foot Patrol.” This operation was deemed a success, and soon similar efforts at saturation were used in the other crime-intense zones.



The San Francisco Police Department then expanded the strategy by employing a multitactical approach to crime reduction. Having already deployed officers in hot spots, the department further targeted individuals identified as major participants in criminal activity.

Within the overall crime reduction strategy, the San Francisco Police Department initiated a number of innovative approaches to crime control directly related to specific problems. A few of the programs implemented include:

- Reverse stolen goods operations were initiated to aid in identifying and eliminating conduits for stolen property.
- Housing Outreach Teams made up of a variety of officers and social service personnel were sent into high-density housing complexes to alleviate criminal activity and provide needed social services.
- Gang Task Force members were tasked with notifying potential victims of gang retaliation.
- School Resource Officers were tasked with identifying the top ten “at-risk” students in their respective schools and providing the information to support organizations to provide relevant services to each student.
- Gun buy-backs were conducted with the aim of arresting gang members. Using a buy-bust tactic, the San Francisco Police Department, through the use of informants, conducted operations designed to obtain guns that were linked to gang members while also arresting the gun’s owner. Moreover, inspectors of the San Francisco Police Department were assigned to work with agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) on gun cases. Also, officers in specific units were authorized to pay informants for information leading to the location of guns.

- Biweekly cease-fire meetings were held with the district attorney's office in which officers involved with gang investigations, criminal investigators, and various federal agencies and adjacent law enforcement entities share information about gang activities and suspects. This included selection of officers by the various partners to assign officers to target specific individuals.
- Biweekly Zone Enforcement Strategy meetings were held to inform officers from the Tactical Unit, station officers, and various investigative units about locations of criminal activity.
- Gang injunctions and "safety zones" were established in three districts in conjunction with the city attorney. Commitment was made to strict enforcement of these injunctions.
- The Fugitive Recovery Enforcement Team was organized to track down high-risk offenders who had become fugitives.
- Violence Reduction Teams—special units supported by motorcycle officers—were utilized to navigate the streets rapidly to suppress actions threatening to become violent and to support foot pursuit of individuals involved in violent or potentially violent confrontations.
- Two nighttime Robbery Abatement Squads were created to conduct follow-up investigations, covert surveillance on identified suspects, and decoy operations.
- The top 60 violent offenders were identified and targeted for arrest. These cases are tracked all the way through conviction.
- Friday morning probation/parole searches were conducted by the police department in conjunction with probation and parole officers.

The police department believes the results are promising. As an example, in just six months, there were more than 600 gun seizures. Morale has improved as officers of the San Francisco Police Department have seen the results, and most believe the strategy works. Only time will determine the long-range benefits of this strategy, but for now all indications are positive.

Summary

The department commenced reorganization partly as a result of a change in the command structure but also as part of the overall crime reduction strategy. Emphasizing decentralized authority, the department placed more emphasis on information analysis to identify areas in need of an immediate police response. Area commanders were also given more flexibility to respond to the demand for services in a timely manner. Moreover, through the use of data analysis to identify crime trends and high-crime geographic areas, the San Francisco Police Department initiated a series of operations specifically designed to attack the identified crime problems.

Tampa, Florida, Police Department—Focus on Four

Population: 301,863 ♦ Approximately 456 Sworn Officers

The Problem

In 2003, Tampa, Florida, seemed like a city besieged. The crime rate was unacceptable, the citizens were angry, and the police were frustrated. The excuses for failure were numerous, having been accumulated over the past three decades: the economy is bad, there are too many single parents and too many dysfunctional families, no one respects authority, and on and on. Badly needed were new ideas or, perhaps, old ideas that were once successful but now are long-forgotten.

Discarding the time-worn excuses, the chief of police, with the full support of the mayor and city council, drew a philosophical line in the sand. Based on the belief that the police can and should make a difference, the police department commenced a systematic process of reorganization and revitalization. The chief believed it was time for the police department to move from a passive excuse-based mode to an aggressive model. Excuses were no longer acceptable; the police would hold themselves accountable for the safety of the community.

This approach would ultimately evolve into the “Focus on Four” crime reduction program, which would be responsible for a 46 percent decrease in crime over the next six years. How this was accomplished is a testament to determination, resilience, and a clear vision for how a police department should function. The ultimate goal was to reduce crime. Therefore, the “Focus on Four” concept was that the Tampa Police Department would develop strategies to reduce the four most frequently occurring crimes.

Change is a difficult process, and this was not an exception in Tampa. Old practices die hard, and organizational inertia, the natural tendency toward operational stagnation, is a powerful force against altering existing practices. Opposition came from two sources: sedentary officers—some of whom were administrators—and the union, which, while not opposed to improvements in policing, was opposed to changes in the existing management-union relationship, especially as it affected personnel assignments.

Systematically, over time the chief refocused the department. First, the department simplified the mission statement so that officers and citizens alike understood why the Tampa Police Department was in business:

“The mission of the Tampa Police Department is to reduce crime and improve the quality of life through a cooperative relationship with all citizens.”

Recognizing that refocusing the department would be impossible without a supportive and active command staff, the city government changed the civil service rules to remove senior management positions from the civil service system. At the same time, the chief established goals that were both clearly stated and measurable and made it clear that everyone would be held accountable for meeting the department’s objectives.

The Plan

With the management team in place, the department created a strategic plan to address the problem. They used a four-stage process:

1. Define the problem using accurate statistics that clarify the overall crime picture and verify the existence of an unacceptable crime rate.
2. Develop a concise, simplified, and measurable goal. Ultimately, the goal was to reduce the crime rate.
3. Define offense-based strategic priorities to accomplish the goal—the four primary crimes identified were:
 - Burglary
 - Robbery
 - Auto burglary
 - Auto theft
4. Define “offender-based strategic priorities” to accomplish the goal. This was defined as the “Worst of the Worst” (WOW)—the most egregious repeat juvenile offenders, with gangs being a particular focus.



Discrepancies with crime statistics are endemic to policing. The Uniform Crime Reporting categories do not always coincide with the criminal laws of a given jurisdiction. The ability to accurately identify a crime problem is dependent on reconciling these differences. The Tampa Police Department discovered that some crimes were overreported, while others were underreported. Clarifying the crime picture, however, enabled the department to identify where the true crime problems existed. With an accurate assessment of the crime picture, the staff was able to focus resources and organizational priorities on those activities most responsible for criminal activity in the city.

The crimes selected for the Focus on Four Crime Reduction Plan were identified through use of existing statistical data. These crimes share two common denominators: the high reporting rate with which they are associated and the fact that offenders committing these four crimes were also responsible for many other crimes in the city and surrounding area.

The command staff also recognized that repeat juvenile offenders were responsible for a significant proportion of the criminal activity. To attack this problem, the police department initiated the WOW program. Working with the juvenile probation department, which, with its limited resources, is often unable to conduct bed checks on home-restricted offenders, officers from the uniform patrol division began conducting these checks. At first the officers conducted these at 8:00 p.m., then 11:00 p.m., and finally at random times.

Based on lessons learned in policing and considering the character of the Tampa crime problem, a multistrategic approach was developed focusing on the “root causes” of Tampa’s crime. This resulted in an intelligence-based response to the crimes that embodied four elements:

1. Intelligence-led policing (ILP)—The use of hard data to drive tactical and strategic decision making. This included tracking crimes as they happened. Crime analysts were assigned to each sector to provide daily intelligence. Officers were provided with information concerning what types of crimes were occurring, where they were occurring, and a list of likely offenders. The Tampa Police Department also reached out to law enforcement agencies in adjacent and overlapping jurisdictions. Information is shared continuously among these agencies, and a strong relationship between the law enforcement partners has evolved based on mutual respect and support.
2. Using a data-driven approach to resource allocation, the department redistributed tactical resources—including the development of:
 - Quick Uniform Attack on Drugs (QUAD)—street-level drug squads.
 - Street Anti-Crime (SAC)—pattern crime squads available for deployment as crime trends were developing.
 - Dividing the city into three smaller and more manageable districts.
3. Proactive and preventive policing initiatives—Officers were rewarded for displaying initiative that embraced the strategic plan. Moreover, self-initiated activity by officers was encouraged to the point where proactive policing became the norm rather than the exception. Officers became more engaged with their community, producing both increased public support and a significant increase in the influx of crime-related information based on officer-citizen interactions. An example of this was the summer programs developed in each district to address juvenile-related crime problems that emerged when schools were not in session. Using data derived during the summer months, the Tampa Police Department continuously addressed areas and individuals identified as problems. After six years, summer crimes were reduced 51 percent.
4. Partnering with the community—The chief acknowledged that implementing ILP is not possible without support and involvement from the community. As part of the effort to engage and involve the community, the department implemented “e-mail

trees,” enhanced their neighborhood watch program, implemented a reverse 9-1-1 program to send out information on hot spots to the community, put officers back in the neighborhoods, and then held precinct commanders accountable for crime in their zones. Moreover, the police department now works closely with other public agencies, such as probation and parole and the courts, to address specific career criminals of all ages.

Summary

The Tampa initiative was dependent on four pillars that formed the foundation of the initiative. These were commitment, organizational change, analysis and information sharing, and management accountability. The steps in the process are outlined below:

1. Commitment
 - Political support from the mayor.
 - Chief of police reallocated resources, changed policies, and modified the personnel system, all to meet the needs of the new strategy.
2. Organizational change
 - An emphasis on increasing police-initiated activity.
 - Rewarding officers for productivity.
 - Personnel had to take responsibility for crime within their areas and were accountable to ensure crime problems were effectively addressed.
 - Using these factors to get personnel to “buy in” to the new Tampa Police Department crime control model and methodology.
3. Analysis and information sharing
 - Analysis.
 - Daily analytic reports related to priority crimes and repeat offenders.
 - Monthly strategic analysis of crime for administrators to aid in planning and resource allocation (*Comprehensive Police Performance Effectiveness Review—COPPER*).
 - Predictive analysis when emerging threat trends were recognized.
 - Daily tactical reports to officer.

- Detectives and plainclothes officers meetings.
 - Administrators meetings.
 - External agencies at all levels of government.
 - Community involvement.
4. Management accountability
- Division Commanders have to know the crime rate and incidents in their divisions.
 - Develop strategies to reduce crime.
 - Deploy resources for crime reduction.

One main point stressed is that there is no “silver bullet” to implementing a successful ILP program, nor does the Tampa Police Department claim that any of these ideas are original. There are numerous elements for success, and to be successful, none of them can be overlooked. Even after all of the various components are addressed, the process does not stop there. Continual evaluation, adjustment, and commitment are necessary to sustain the program and address emerging needs and issues.

Conclusion

As was noted in the beginning of this document, innovation in policing occurs when leaders think creatively and are willing to adopt nontraditional practices to the policing enterprise. Initiatives documented in this monograph reflect the use of ILP in diverse ways and in diverse communities.

ILP can be applied to any size law enforcement jurisdiction. When there is a difficult crime problem plaguing a community, there must be a careful analysis of the problem to understand the true causal factors. With this knowledge, intelligence-based strategies can be developed to eliminate (or at least reduce) its adverse effect on a community. More important, as learned through these case studies, successful implementation of an “ILP solution” typically requires the development of partnerships and effective communications.

Partnerships may be with other law enforcement agencies, the district attorney’s office, victim advocacy organizations, probation and parole agencies, and even the private sector. Beyond effective communications with partners, there is also the need to ensure that mechanisms and technologies are in place to provide consistent communications internally throughout the agency.

These illustrations of effective ILP are based on a solid foundation of research and experimentation related to the elimination of disorder, community policing, CompStat, smart policing, and creative management. Reliance on this knowledge base can provide significant support for the development of programming to address the unique crime problems of any community.